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Abstract. As facial interaction systems are prevalently deployed, secu-
rity and reliability of these systems become a critical issue, with substan-
tial research efforts devoted. Among them, face anti-spoofing emerges as
an important area, whose objective is to identify whether a presented
face is live or spoof. Though promising progress has been achieved, ex-
isting works still have difficulty in handling complex spoof attacks and
generalizing to real-world scenarios. The main reason is that current
face anti-spoofing datasets are limited in both quantity and diversity. To
overcome these obstacles, we contribute a large-scale face anti-spoofing
dataset, CelebA-Spoof, with the following appealing properties: 1)
Quantity: CelebA-Spoof comprises of 625,537 pictures of 10,177 subjects,
significantly larger than the existing datasets. 2) Diversity: The spoof
images are captured from 8 scenes (2 environments * 4 illumination condi-
tions) with more than 10 sensors. 3) Annotation Richness: CelebA-Spoof
contains 10 spoof type annotations, as well as the 40 attribute annotations
inherited from the original CelebA dataset. Equipped with CelebA-Spoof,
we carefully benchmark existing methods in a unified multi-task frame-
work, Auxiliary Information Embedding Network (AENet), and
reveal several valuable observations. Our key insight is that, compared
with the commonly-used binary supervision or mid-level geometric repre-
sentations, rich semantic annotations as auxiliary tasks can greatly boost
the performance and generalizability of face anti-spoofing across a wide
range of spoof attacks. Through comprehensive studies, we show that
CelebA-Spoof serves as an effective training data source. Models trained
on CelebA-Spoof (without fine-tuning) exhibit state-of-the-art perfor-
mance on standard benchmarks such as CASIA-MFSD. The datasets are
available at https://github.com/Davidzhangyuanhan/CelebA-Spoof .
Keywords: Face Anti-Spoofing, Large-Scale Dataset
? equal contribution
ar
X
iv
:2
00
7.
12
34
2v
1 
 [c
s.C
V]
  2
4 J
ul 
20
20
2 Zhang et al.
Outdoor
Back Illumination
Fig. 1. A quick glance of CelebA-Spoof face anti-spoofing dataset with its attributes.
Hypothetical space of scenes are partitioned by attributes and Live/Spoof. In reality,
this space is much higher dimensional and there are no clean boundaries between
attributes presence and absence
1 Introduction
Face anti-spoofing is an important task in computer vision, which aims to facilitate
facial interaction systems to determine whether a presented face is live or spoof.
With the successful deployments in phone unlock, access control and e-wallet
payment, facial interaction systems already become an integral part in the real
world. However, there exists a vital threat to these face interaction systems.
Imagine a scenario where an attacker with a photo or video of you can unlock
your phone and even pay his bill using your e-wallet. To this end, face anti-
spoofing has emerged as a crucial technique to protect our privacy and property
from being illegally used by others.
Most modern face anti-spoofing methods [10,19,36] are fueled by the avail-
ability of face anti-spoofing datasets [23,4,37,29,5,34,39], as shown in Table 1.
However, there are several limitations with the existing datasets: 1) Lack of
Diversity. Existing datasets suffer from lacking sufficient subjects, sessions and
input sensors (e.g. mostly less than 2000 subject, 4 sessions and 10 input sensors).
2) Lack of Annotations. Existing datasets have only annotated the type of spoof
type. Face anti-spoof community lacks a densely annotated dataset covering rich
attributes, which can further help researchers to explore face anti-spoofing task
with diverse attributes. 3) Performance Saturation. The classification perfor-
mance on several face anti-spoofing datasets has already saturated, failing to
evaluate the capability of existing and future algorithms. For example, the recall
under FPR = 0.5% on SiW and Oulu-NPU datasets using vanilla ResNet-18 has
already reached 100.0% and 99.0%, respectively.
To address these shortcomings in existing face anti-spoofing dataset, in
this work we propose a large-scale and densely annotated dataset, CelebA-
Spoof. Besides the standard Spoof Type annotation, CelebA-Spoof also contains
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annotations for Illumination Condition and Environment, which express more
information in face anti-spoofing, compared to categorical label like Live/Spoof.
Essentially, these dense annotations describe images by answering questions
like “Is the people in the image Live or Spoof?”, “What kind of spoof type
is this?”, “What kind of illumination condition is this?” and “What kind of
environment in the background?”. Specifically, all live images in CelebA-Spoof
are selected from CelebA [25], and all Spoof images are collected and annotated
by skillful annotators. CelebA-Spoof has several appealing properties. 1) Large-
Scale. CelebA-Spoof comprises of a total of 10177 subjects, 625537 images,
which is the largest dataset in face anti-spoofing. 2) Diversity. For collecting
images, we use more than 10 different input tensors, including phones, pads and
personal computers (PC). Besides, we cover images in 8 different sessions. 3) Rich
Annotations. Each image in CelebA-Spoof is defined with 43 different attributes:
40 types of Face Attribute defined in CelebA [25] plus 3 attributes of face anti-
spoofing, including: Spoof Type, Illumination Condition and Environment. With
rich annotations, we can comprehensively investigate face anti-spoofing task from
various perspectives.
Equipped with CelebA-Spoof, we design a simple yet powerful network named
Auxiliary information Embedding Network (AENet), and carefully benchmark
existing methods within this unified multi-task framework. Several valuable
observations are revealed: 1) We analyze the effectiveness of auxiliary geometric
information for different spoof types and illustrate the sensitivity of geometric
information to special illumination conditions. Geometric information includes
depth map and reflection map. 2) We validate auxiliary semantic information,
including face attribute and spoof type, plays an important role in improving
classification performance. 3) We build three CelebA-Spoof benchmarks based on
this two auxiliary information. Through extensive experiments, we demonstrate
that our large-scale and densely annotated dataset serves as an effective data
source in face anti-spoofing to achieve state-of-the-art performance. Furthermore,
models trained with auxiliary semantic information exhibit great generalizability
compared to other alternatives.
In summary, the contributions of this work are three-fold:1) We contribute
a large-scale face anti-spoofing dataset, CelebA-Spoof, with 625,537 images
from 10,177 subjects, which includes 43 rich attributes on face, illumination,
environment and spoof types. 2) Based on these rich attributes, we further propose
a simple yet powerful multi-task framework, namely AENet. Through AENet,
we conduct extensive experiments to explore the roles of semantic information
and geometric information in face anti-spoofing. 3) To support comprehensive
evaluation and diagnosis, we establish three versatile benchmarks to evaluate
the performance and generalization ability of various methods under different
carefully-designed protocols. With several valuable observations revealed, we
demonstrate the effectiveness of CelebA-Spoof and its rich attributes which can
significantly facilitate future research.
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Table 1. The comparison of CelebA-Spoof with existing datasets of face anti-spoofing.
Different illumination conditions and environments make up different sessions, (V
means video, I means image; Ill. Illumination condition, Env. Environment; - means
this information is not annotated)
Dataset Year Modality #Subjects #Data(V/I) #Sensor
#Semantic Attribute
#Face Attribute Spoof type #Session (Ill.,Env.)
Replay-Attack [5] 2012 RGB 50 1,200 (V) 2
\
1 Print, 2 Replay 1 (-.-)
CASIA-MFSD [39] 2012 RGB 50 600 (V) 3 1 Print, 1 Replay 3 (-.-)
3DMAD [9] 2014 RGB/Depth 14 255 (V) 2 1 3D mask 3 (-.-)
MSU-MFSD [34] 2015 RGB 35 440 (V) 2 1 Print, 2 Replay 1 (-.-)
Msspoof [14] 2015 RGB/IR 21 4,704 (I) 2 1 Print 7 (-.7)
HKBU-MARs V2 [21] 2016 RGB 12 1,008 (V) 7 2 3D masks 6 (6.-)
MSU-USSA [29] 2016 RGB 1,140 10,260 (I) 2 2 Print, 6 Replay 1 (-.-)
Oulu-NPU [4] 2017 RGB 55 5,940 (V) 6 2 Print, 2 Replay 3 (-.-)
SiW [23] 2018 RGB 165 4,620 (V) 2 2 Print, 4 Replay 4 (-.-)
CASIA-SURF [37] 2018 RGB/IR/Depth 1,000 21,000 (V) 1 5 Paper Cut 1 (-.-)
CSMAD [1] 2018 RGB/IR/Depth/LWIR 14 246 (V),17 (I) 1 1 silicone mask 4 (4.-)
HKBU-MARs V1+ [20] 2018 RGB 12 180(v) 1 1 3D mask 1 (1.-)
SiW-M [24] 2019 RGB 493 1,628 (V) 4
1 Print, 1 Replay
5 3D Mask, 3 Make Up, 3 Partial
3 (-.-)
CelebA-Spoof 2020 RGB 10,177 625,537 (I) >10 40
3 Print, 3 Replay
1 3D, 3 Paper Cut
8 (4,2)
2 Related Work
Face Anti-Spoofing Datasets. Face anti-spoofing community mainly has
three types of datasets. First, the multi-modal dataset: 3DMAD [9], Msspoof
[6], CASIA-SURF [37] and CSMAD [1]. However, since widespread used mobile
phones are not equipped with suitable modules, such datasets cannot be widely
used in the real scene. Second is the single-modal dataset, such as Replay Attack
[5], CASIA-MFSD [39], MSU-MFSD [34], MSU-USSA [29] and HKBU-MARS
V2 [21]. But these datasets have been collected for more than three years. With
the rapid development of electronic equipment, the acquisition equipment of
these datasets is completely outdated and cannot meet the actual needs. SiW
[23], Oulu-NPU [4] and HKBU-MAR V1+ [20] are relatively up-to-date. However,
the limited number of subjects, spoof types, and environment (Only indoors) in
these datasets does not guarantee for the generalization capability required in
the real application. Third, SiW-M [24] is mainly used for Zero-Shot face anti-
spoofing tasks. CelebA-Spoof datasets have 625537 pictures from 10177 subjects,
8 scenes (2 environments * 4 illumination conditions) with rich annotations. The
characteristic of Large-scale and diversity can further fill the gap between face
anti-spoofing dataset and real scenes. with rich annotations we can better analyze
face anti-spoofing task. All datasets mentioned above are listed in Table 1.
Face Anti-Spoofing Methods. In recent years, face anti-spoofing algorithms
have seen great progress. Most traditional algorithms focus on handcrafted fea-
tures, such as LBP [5,26,27,35], HoG [26,35,30] and SURF [2]. Other works also
focused on temporal features such as eye-blinking [28,32] and lips motion [17]. In
order to improve the robustness to light changes, some researchers have paid at-
tention to different color spaces, such as HSV [3], YCbcR [2] and Fourier spectrum
[18]. With the development of the deep learning model, researchers have also be-
gun to focus on Convolutional Neural Network based methods. [10,19] considered
the face PAD problem as binary classification and perform good performance.
The method of auxiliary supervision is also used to improve the performance of
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binary classification supervision. Atoum et al. let the full convolutional network
to learn the depth map and then assist the binary classification task. Liu et
al. [20,22] proposed remote toplethysmography (rPPG signal)-based methods
to foster the development of 3D face anti-spoofing. Liu et al. [23] proposed to
leverage depth map combined with rPPG signal as the auxiliary supervision
information. Kim et al. [16] proposed using depth map and reflection map as the
Bipartite auxiliary supervision. Besides, Yang et al. [36] proposed to combine
the spatial information with the temporal information in the video stream to
improve the generalization of the model. Amin et al. [15] solved the problem of
face anti-spoofing by decomposing a spoof photo into a Live photo and a Spoof
noise pattern. These methods mentioned above are prone to over-fitting on the
training data, the generalization performance is poor in real scenarios. In order to
solve the poor generalization problem, Shao et al. [31] adopted transfer learning
to further improve performance. Therefore, a more complex face anti-spoofing
dataset with large-scale and diversity is necessary. From extensive experiments,
CelebA-Spoof has been shown to significantly improve generalization of basic
models, In addition, based on auxiliary semantic information method can further
achieve better generalization.
3 CelebA-Spoof Dataset
Existing face anti-spoofing datasets cannot satisfy the requirements for real
scenario applications. As shown in Table 1, most of them contain fewer than 200
subjects and 5 sessions, meanwhile they are only captured indoor with fewer than
10 types of input sensors. On the contrary, our proposed CelebA-Spoof dataset
provides 625, 537 pictures and 10, 177 subjects, therefore offering a superior
comprehensive dataset for the area of face anti-spoofing. Furthermore, each image
is annotated with 43 attributes. This abundant information enrich the diversity
and make face anti-spoofing more illustrative. To our best knowledge, our dataset
surpasses all the existing datasets both in scale and diversity.
In this section, we describe our CelebA-Spoof dataset and analyze it through
a variety of informative statistics. The dataset is built based on CelebA [25],
where all the live people in this dataset are from CelebA. We collect and annotate
Spoof images of CelebA-Spoof.
3.1 Dataset Construction
Live Data. The live data are directly inherited from CelebA dataset [25]. CelebA
is a well-known large-scale facial attribute dataset with more than eight million
attribute labels. It covers face images with large pose variations and background
clutters. We manually examine the images in CelebA and remove those “spoof”
images, including posters, advertisements and cartoon portrait6.
Spoof Instrument Selection. The source for spoof instruments is selected
from the aforementioned live data. There are totally more than 202, 599 live
6 There are 347 images of this kind. Examples are shown in the supplementary material.
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Fig. 2. An illustration of the collection dimension in CelebA-Spoof. In detail, these
three dimensions boost the diversity of the dataset
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Fig. 3. Representative examples of the semantic attributes (i.e. spoof type, illumination
and environment) defined upon spoof images. In detail, (a) 4 macro-types and 11 micro-
types of spoof type and (b) 4 illumination and 2 types of environmental conditions are
defined
images from 10, 177 subjects. Each subject has multiple images ranging from 5
to 40. All subjects are covered in our spoof instrument production. In addition,
to guarantee both the diversity and balance of spoof instruments, some subjects
are filtered. Specifically, for one subject with more than k source images, we rank
them according to the face size with the bounding box provided by CelebA and
select Top-k source images. For those subjects with fewer than k source images,
we directly adopt all of them. We set k = 20. As a result, 87, 926 source images
are selected from 202, 599 for further spoof instruments manufacture.
Spoof Data Collection. We hired 8 collectors to collect spoof data and another
2 annotators to refine labeling for all data. To improve the generalization and
diversity of the dataset, as shown in Figure 2, we define three collection dimensions
with fine-grained quantities: 1) Five Angles - All spoof type need to traverse all
five types of angles including “vertical”, “down”, “up”, “forward” and “backward”.
The angle of inclination is between [−30◦, 30◦]. 2) Four Shapes - There are a
total of four shapes, i.e. “normal”, “inside”, “outside” and “corner”. 3) Four
Sensors - We collected 24 popular devices with four types, i.e. “PC”, “camera”,
“tablet” and “phone”, as the input sensors7. These devices are equipped with
different resolutions, ranging from 40 million to 12 million pixels. The number of
input sensors is far more than the existing face anti-spoofing datasets as shown
in Table 1.
7 Detailed information can be found in the supplementary material.
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Fig. 4. The statistical distribution of CelebA-Spoof dataset. (a) Overall live and spoof
distribution as well as the face size statistic. (b) An exemplar of live attribute, i.e.
“gender”. (c) Three types of spoof attributes
3.2 Semantic Information Collection
In recent decades, studies in attribute-based representations of objects, faces, and
scenes have drawn large attention as a complement to categorical representations.
However, rare works attempt to exploit semantic information in face anti-spoofing.
Indeed, for face anti-spoofing, additional semantic information can characterize
the target images by attributes rather than discriminated assignment into a single
category, i.e. “live” or “spoof”.
Semantic for Live - Face Attribute Sf. In our dataset, we directly adopt 40
types of face attributes defined in CelebA [25] as “live” attributes. Attributes of
“live” faces always refer to gender, hair color, expression and etc. These abundant
semantic cues have shown their potential in providing more information for face
identification. It is the first time to incorporate them into face anti-spoofing.
Extensive studies can be found in Sec. 6.1.
Semantic for Spoof - Spoof Type Ss, Illumination Si, and Environment
Se. Differs to “live” face attributes, “spoof” images might be characterized by
another bunch of properties or attributes as they are not only related to the face
region. Indeed, the material of spoof type, illumination condition and environment
where spoof images are captured can express more semantic information in “spoof”
images, as shown in Figure 3. Note that the combination of illumination and
environment forms the “session” defined in the existing face anti-spoofing dataset.
As shown in Table 1, the combination of four illumination conditions and two
environments forms 8 sessions. To our best knowledge, CelebA-Spoof is the first
dataset covering spoof images in outdoor environment.
3.3 Statistics on CelebA-Spoof Dataset
The CelebA-Spoof dataset is constructed with a total of 625, 537 images. As
shown in 4(a), the ratio of live and spoof is 1 : 3. Face size in all images is mainly
between 0.01 million pixels to 0.1 million pixels. We split the CelebA-Spoof
dataset into training, validation, and test sets with a ratio of 8 : 1 : 1. Note
that all three sets are guaranteed to have no overlap on subjects, which means
there is no case of a live image of one certain subject in the training set while its
counterpart spoof image in the test set. The distribution of live images in three
splits is the same as that defined in the CelebA dataset.
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Fig. 5. Auxiliary information Embedding Network (AENet). We use two Conv3×3 after
CNN and upsample to size 14× 14 to learn the geometric information. Besides, we use
three FC layers to learn the semantic information. The prediction score of Sf of spoof
image should be very low and the prediction result of Ss and S i of live image should be
“No illumination” and “No attack” which belongs to the first label in Ss and S i
The semantic attribute statistics are shown in Figure 4(c). The portion of
each type of attack is almost the same to guarantee a balanced distribution. It is
easy to collect data under normal illumination in an indoor environment where
most existing datasets adopt. Besides such easy cases, in CelebA-Spoof dataset,
we also involve 12% dark, 11% back, and 19% strong illumination. Furthermore,
both indoor and outdoor environments contain all illumination conditions.
4 Auxiliary Information Embedding Network
Equipped with CelebA-Spoof dataset, in this section, we design a simple yet
effective network named Auxiliary information Embedding Network (AENet),
as shown in Figure 5. In addition to the main binary classification branch
(in green), we 1) Incorporate the semantic branch (in orange) to exploit the
auxiliary capacity of rich annotated semantic attributes in the dataset, and
2) Benchmark the existing geometric auxiliary information within this unified
multi-task framework.
AENetC,S . refers to the multi-task jointly learn auxiliary “semantic” attributes
and binary “classification” labels. Such auxiliary semantic attributes defined
in our dataset provide complement cues rather than discriminated assignment
into a single category. The semantic attributes are learned via the backbone
network followed by three FC layers. In detail, given a batch of n images, based
on AENetC,S , we learn live/spoof class {Ck}nk=1 and semantic information, i.e.
live face attributes {S fk}nk=1, spoof type {Ssk}nk=1 and illumination conditions
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{S ik}nk=1 simultaneously8. The loss function of our AENetC,S is
Lc,s = LC + λfLSf + λsLSs + λiLSi , (1)
where LSf is binary cross entropy loss. LC , LSs and LSi are softmax cross entropy
losses. We set the loss weights λf = 1, λs = 0.1 and λi = 0.01, λ values are
empirically selected to balance the contribution of each loss.
AENetC,G. Besides the semantic auxiliary information, some recent works claim
some geometric cues such as reflection map and depth map can facilitate face
anti-spoofing. As shown in Figure 5 (marked in blue), spoof images exhibit even
and the flat surfaces which can be easily distinguished by the depth map. The
reflection maps, on the other hand, may display reflection artifacts caused by
reflected light from flat surface. However, rare works explore their pros and cons.
AENetC,G also learn auxiliary geometric information in a multi-task fashion
with live/spoof classification. Specifically, we concate a Conv 3× 3 after the
backbone network and upsample to 14× 14 to output the geometric maps. We
denote depth and reflection cues as Gd and Gr respectively. The loss function is
defined as
Lc,g = Lc + λdLGd + λrLGr , (2)
where LGd and LGr are mean squared error losses. λd and λr are set to 0.1. In
detail, refer to [16], the ground truth of the depth map of live image is generated
by PRNet [11] and the ground truth of the reflection map of the spoof image is
generated by the method in [38]. Besides, the ground truth of the depth map of
the spoof image and the ground truth of the reflection map of the live images
are zero.
5 Experimental Settings
Evaluation Metrics. Different metrics have been taken to evaluate previous
methods that make the comparison inconsistent. To establish a comprehensive
benchmark, we unify all the commonly used metrics (i.e. APCER, BPCER, ACER,
EER, and HTER)9 [4,23,15,36] and add another two criteria (i.e. FPR@Recall and
AUC). APCER and BPCER are used to evaluate the error rate of live and spoof
image respectively. ACER is the average of the APCER and the BPCER. Besides,
AUC can evaluate the overall classification performance, and FPR@Recall can
expose detailed Recalls corresponding to some specific FPRs. The aforementioned
metrics are employed on intra-dataset (CelebA-Spoof) evaluation, and for cross-
dataset evaluation, HTER [12] is used extensively.
Implementation Details. We initialize the backbone network10 with the pa-
rameters pre-trained on ImageNet. The network takes face image as the input
8 Note that we do not learn environments Se since we take face image as input where
environment cues (i.e. indoor or outdoor) cannot provide more valuable information
yet illumination influences much.
9 Detailed definitions and formulations are listed in the supplementary material.
10 For fair comparison, ResNet-18 is used in all experiments. We also take another
heavier backbone, i.e. Xception, to enrich the benchmarks.
10 Zhang et al.
Table 2. Different settings in ablation study. For Baseline, we use softmax score of C
for classification (a) For AENetS , we use the average softmax score of Sf, Ss and S i
for classification. AENetSf , AENetSs and AENetSi refer to each single spoof semantic
attribute respectively. Based on AENetC,S , w/o Sf, w/o Ss, w/o S i mean AENetC,S
discards Sf, Ss and S i respectively. (b) For AENetGd , we use
∥∥Gd∥∥
2
for classification.
Based on AENetC,G , w/o Gd, w/o Gr mean AENetC,G discards Gd and Gr respectively
(a) Baseline AENetS AENetSf AENetSs AENetS i
AENetC,S
w/o S f
AENetC,S
w/o Ss
AENetC,S
w/o S i
AENetC,S (b) Baseline AENetGd
AENetC,G
w/o Gr
AENetC,S
w/o Gd
AENetC,G
Live/Spoof
√ √ √ √ √
Live/Spoof
√ √ √ √
Face Attribute
√ √ √ √ √
Reflection Map
√ √
Spoof Type
√ √ √ √ √
Illumination Conditions
√ √ √ √ √
Depth map
√ √ √
with a size of 224×224. The bounding box of faces are extracted by RetinaFace [8].
We use color distortion for data augmentation. SGD optimizer is adopted for
training. The learning rate is set to 0.005 for 50 epochs.
6 Ablation Study on CelebA-Spoof
Based on our rich annotations in CelebA-Spoof and the designed AENet, we
conduct extensive experiments to analyze semantic information and geometric
information. Several valuable observations have been revealed: 1) We validate
that S f and Ss can facilitate live/spoof classification performance greatly. 2) We
analyze the effectiveness of geometric information on different spoof types and
find that depth information is particularly sensitive to dark illumination.
6.1 Study of Semantic Information
In this subsection, we explore the role of different semantic informations annotated
in CelebA-Spoof on face anti-spoofing. Based on AENetC,S , we design eight
different models in the Table 2(a). The key observations are:
Binary Supervision is Indispensable. As shown in Table 3(a), Compared
to baseline, AENetS which only leverages three semantic attributes to do the
auxiliary job cannot surpass the performance of baseline. However, as shown in
3(b), AENetC,S which jointly learns auxiliary semantic attributes and binary
classification significantly improves the performance of baseline. Therefore we
can infer that even such rich semantic information cannot fully replace live/spoof
information. But live/spoof with semantic attributes as auxiliary information can
be more effective. This is because the semantic attributes of an image cannot be
included completely, and a better classification performance cannot be achieved
only by relying on several annotated semantic attributes. However, semantic
attributes can help the model pay more attention to cues in the image, thus
improving the classification performance of the model.
Semantic Attribute Matters. From Table 3(c), we study the impact of differ-
ent individual semantic attributes on AENetC,S . As shown in this table, AENetC,S
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Table 3. Semantic information study results in Sec. 6.1. (a) AENetS which only depends
on semantic attributes for classification cannot surpass the performance of baseline. (b)
AENetC,S which leverages all semantic attributes achieve the best result. Bolds are
the best results; ↑ means bigger value is better; ↓ means smaller value is better
Model
Recall (%)↑
AUC ↑ EER (%) ↓ APCER (%) ↓ BPCER (%) ↓ ACER (%) ↓
FPR = 1% FPR = 0.5% FPR = 0.1%
(a)
Baseline 97.9 95.3 85.9 0.9984 1.6 6.1 1.6 3.8
AENetS 98.0 96.0 80.4 0.9981 1.4 6.89 1.44 4.17
(b) AENetC,S 98.8 97.4 90.0 0.9988 1.1 4.62 1.09 2.85
(c)
AENetC,S w/o S i 98.1 96.5 86.4 0.9982 1.3 4.62 1.35 2.99
AENetC,S w/o Ss 98.2 96.5 89.4 0.9986 1.3 5.31 1.25 3.28
AENetC,S w/o Sf 97.8 95.4 83.6 0.9979 1.3 5.19 1.37 3.28
0
0.7
1.45
0
1.5
3
(a) (b)
AENetC,SAENetC,Sw/oSsAENetC,Sw/oS i AENetC,Sw/oS f
A
P
C
E
R
Ss
B
P
C
E
R
Sf
Fig. 6. Representative examples of dropping partial semantic attributes on AENetC,S
performance. In detail, higher APCERSs and BPCERSf are worse results. (a) Spoof
types where AENetC,S w/o Ss achieve the worst APCERSs . (b) Face attributes where
AENetC,S w/o Sf achieve the worst BPCERSf
w/o Ss achieves the worst APCER. Since APCER reflects the classification abil-
ity of spoof images, it shows that compared to other semantic attributes, spoof
types would significantly affect the performance of the spoof images classification
of AENetC,S . Furthermore, we list detail information of AENetC,S in Figure
6(a). As shown in this figure, AENetC,S without spoof types gets the 5 worst
APCERSs out of 10 APCERSs and we show up these 5 values in this figure.
Besides, in Table 3(b), AENetC,S w/o S f gets the highest BPCER. And we also
obtain the BPCERSf of each face attribute. As shown in Figure 6(b), among 40
face attributes, BPCERSf of AENetC,S w/o S f occupies 25 worst scores. Since
BPCER reflects the classification ability of live images, it demonstrate S f plays
an important role in the classification of live images.
Qualitative Evaluation. Success and failure cases on live/spoof and semantic
attributes predictions are shown in Figure 7. For live examples, the first example
in Figure 7(a-i) with “glasses“ and “hat“ help AENetC,S to pay more attention
to the clues of the live image and further improve the performance of prediction
of live/spoof. Besides, the first example in Figure 7(a-ii). AENetC,S significantly
improve the classification performance of live/spoof comparing to baseline. This
is because spoof semantic attributes including “back illumination” and “phone”
help AENetC,S recognize the distinct characteristics of spoof image. Note that
the prediction of the second example in Figure 7(b-i) is mistaken.
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Table 4. Geometric information study results in Sec. 6.2. (a) AENetGd which only
depends on the depth map for classification performs worst than baseline. (b) AENetC,G
which leverages all semantic attributes achieve the best result. Bolds are the best
results; ↑ means bigger value is better; ↓ means smaller value is better
Model
Recall (%)↑
AUC↑ EER (%)↓ APCER (%)↓ BPCER (%)↓ ACER (%)↓
FPR = 1% FPR = 0.5% FPR = 0.1%
(a)
Baseline 97.9 95.3 85.9 0.9984 1.6 6.1 1.6 3.8
AENetGd 97.8 96.2 87.0 0.9946 1.6 7.33 1.68 4.51
(b) AENetC,G 98.4 96.8 86.7 0.9985 1.2 5.34 1.19 3.26
(c)
AENetC,G w/o Gd 98.3 96.1 87.7 0.9976 1.2 5.91 1.27 3.59
AENetC,G w/o Gr 97.9 95.7 84.1 0.9973 1.3 5.71 1.38 3.55
6.2 Study of Geometric Information
Based on AENetC,} under different settings, we design four models as shown in
Table 2(b) and use semantic attributes we annotated to analyze the usage of
geometric information in face anti-spoofing task. The key observations are:
Depth Maps are More Versatile. As shown in Table 4(a), geometric infor-
mation is insufficient to be the unique supervision for live/spoof classification.
However, it can boost the performance of the baseline when it serves as an
auxiliary supervision. Besides, we study the impact of different individual geomet-
ric information on AENetC,G performance. As shown in Figure 8(a), AENetC,G
w/o Gd performs the best in spoof type: “replay” (macro definition), because
the reflect artifacts appear frequently in these three spoof types. For “phone”,
AENetC,G w/o Gd improves 56% comparing to the baseline. However AENetC,G
w/o Gd gets worse result than baseline in spoof type: “print” (macro definition).
Moreover, AENetC,G w/o Gr helps greatly to improve the classification perfor-
mance of baseline in both “replay” and “print”(macro definition). Especially for
“poster”, AENetC,G w/o Gr improves baseline by 81%. Therefore, the depth map
can improve classification performance in most spoof types, but the function of
the reflection map is mainly reflected in “replay”(macro definition).
Sensitive to Illumination. As shown in Figure 8(a), in spoof type “print”(macro
definition), the performance of the AENetC,G w/o Gr on “A4” is much worse than
“poster” and “photo”, although they are both in “print” spoof type. The main
reason for the large difference in performance among these three spoof types
for AENetC,G w/o Gr is that the learning of the depth map is sensitive to dark
illumination, as shown in Figure 8(b). When we calculate APCER under other
illumination conditions: normal, strong and back, AENetC,G w/o Gr achieves
almost the same results among “A4”, “poster” and “photo”.
7 Benchmarks
In order to facilitate future research in the community, we carefully build three
different benchmarks to investigate face anti-spoofing algorithms. Specifically, for
a comprehensive evaluation, besides ResNet-18, we also provide the corresponding
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Fig. 7. Success and failure cases. The row(i) present the live image and row(ii) present
the spoof image. For each image, the first row is the highest score of live/spoof prediction
of baseline and others are the highest live/spoof and the highest semantic attributes
predictions of AENetC,S . Blue indicates correctly predicted results and orange indicates
the wrong results. In detail, we list the top three prediction scores of face attributes in
the last three rows of each image
results based on a heavier backbone, i.e. Xception. Detailed information of the
results based on Xception are shown in the supplementary material.
7.1 Intra-Dataset Benchmark
Based on this benchmark, models are trained and evaluated on the whole train-
ing set and testing set of CelebA-Spoof. This benchmark evaluates the overall
capability of the classification models. According to different input data types,
there are two kinds of face anti-spoof methods, i.e. “ video-driven methods” and
“image-driven methods”. Since the data in CelebA-Spoof are image-based, we
benchmark state-of-the-art “image-driven methods” in this subsection. As shown
in Table 5, AENetC,S,G which combines geometric and semantic information has
achieved the best results on CelebA-Spoof. Specifically, our approach outperforms
the state-of-the-art by 38% with much fewer parameters.
7.2 Cross-Domain Benchmark
Since face anti-spoofing is an open-set problem, even though CelebA-Spoof is
equipped with diverse images, it is impossible to cover all spoof types, environ-
ments, sensors, etc. that exist in the real world. Inspired by [4,23], we carefully
design two protocols for CelebA-Spoof based on real-world scenarios. In each
protocol, we evaluate the performance of trained models under controlled domain
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Fig. 8. Representative examples of the effectiveness of geometric information. Higher
APCERSs is worse. (a) AENetC,G w/o Gd perform the best in spoof type: “replay”(macro
definition) and AENetC,G w/o Gr perform the best in spoof type: “print”(macro defini-
tion). (b) The performance of AENetC,G w/o Gr improve largely on spoof type: “A4”,
if we only calculate APCER under illumination conditions: “normal”, “strong” and
“back”
Table 5. Intro-dataset Benchmark results on CelebA-Spoof. AENetC,S,G achieved the
best result. Bolds are the best results; ↑ means bigger value is better; ↓ means smaller
value is better. * Model 2 defined in Auxiliary can be used as “image driven method”
Model Backbone Parm. (MB)
Recall (%)↑
AUC↑ EER (%)↓ APCER (%)↓ BPCER (%)↓ ACER (%)↓
FPR = 1% FPR = 0.5% FPR = 0.1%
Auxiliary* [23] - 22.1 97.3 95.2 83.2 0.9972 1.2 5.71 1.41 3.56
BASN [16] VGG16 569.7 98.9 97.8 90.9 0.9991 1.1 4.0 1.1 2.6
AENetC,S,G ResNet-18 42.7 98.9 97.3 87.3 0.9989 0.9 2.29 0.96 1.63
shifts. Specifically, we define two protocols. 1) Protocol 1 - Protocol 1 evaluates
the cross-medium performance of various spoof types. This protocol includes
3 macro types of spoof, where each covers 3 micro types of spoof. These three
macro types of spoof are “print”, “repay” and “paper cut”. In detail, in each
macro type of spoof, we choose 2 of their micro type of spoof for training, and
the others for testing. Specifically, “A4”, “face mask” and “PC” are selected for
testing. 2) Protocol 2 - Protocol 2 evaluates the effect of input sensor variations.
According to imaging quality, we split input sensors into three groups: low-quality
sensor, middle-quality sensor and high-quality sensor11. Since we need to test
on three different kinds of sensor and the average performance of FPR-Recall
is hard to measure, we do not include FPR-Recall in the evaluation metrics of
protocol 2. Table 6 shows the performance under each protocol.
7.3 Cross-Dataset Benchmark
In this subsection, we perform cross-dataset testing on CelebA-Spoof and CASIA-
MFSD dataset to further construct the cross-dataset benchmark. On the one
hand, we offer a quantitative result to measure the quality of our dataset. On
the other hand, we can evaluate the generalization ability of different methods
according to this benchmark. The current largest face anti-spoofing dataset
11 Please refer to supplementary for the detailed input sensors information.
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Table 6. Cross-domain benchmark results of CelebA-Spoof. Bolds are the best results;
↑ means bigger value is better; ↓ means smaller value is better
Protocol Model
Recall (%) ↑
AUC↑ EER (%)↓ APCER (%)↓ BPCER (%)↓ ACER (%)↓
FPR = 1% FPR = 0.5% FPR = 0.1%
1
Baseline 93.7 86.9 69.6 0.996 2.5 5.7 2.52 4.11
AENetC,G 93.3 88.6 74.0 0.994 2.5 5.28 2.41 3.85
AENetC,S 93.4 89.3 71.3 0.996 2.4 5.63 2.42 4.04
AENetC,S,G 95.0 91.4 73.6 0.995 2.1 4.09 2.09 3.09
2
Baseline # # # 0.998 ±0.002 1.5±0.8 8.53±2.6 1.56±0.81 5.05±1.42
AENetC,G # # # 0.995±0.003 1.6±4.5 8.95±1.07 1.67±0.9 5.31±0.95
AENetC,S # # # 0.997±0.002 1.2±0.7 4.01±2.9 1.24±0.67 3.96±1.79
AENetC,S,G # # # 0.998±0.002 1.3±0.7 4.94±3.42 1.24±0.73 3.09±2.08
Table 7. Cross-dataset benchmark results. AENetC,S,G based on ResNet-18 achieves
the best generalization performance. Bolds are the best results; ↑ means bigger value
is better; ↓ means smaller value is better
Model Training Testing HTER (%) ↓
FAS-TD-SF [33] SiW CASIA-MFSD 39.4
FAS-TD-SF [33] CASIA-SURF CASIA-MFSD 37.3
AENetC,S,G SiW CASIA-MFSD 27.6
Baseline CelebA-Spoof CASIA-MFSD 14.3
AENetC,G CelebA-Spoof CASIA-MFSD 14.1
AENetC,S CelebA-Spoof CASIA-MFSD 12.1
AENetC,S,G CelebA-Spoof CASIA-MFSD 11.9
CASIA-SURF [37] adopted FAS-TD-SF [33] (which is trained on SiW or CASIA-
SURF and tested on CASIA-MFSD) to demonstrate the quality of CASIA-SURF.
Following this setting, we first train AENetC,G , AENetC,S and AENetC,S,G based
on CelebA-Spoof and then test them on CASIA-MFSD to evaluate the quality of
CelebA-Spoof. As shown in Table 7, we can conclude that: 1) The diversity and
large quantities of CelebA-Spoof drastically boosts the performance of vanilla
model; a simple ResNet-18 achieves state-of-the-art cross-dataset performance.
2) Comparing to geometric information, semantic information equips the model
with better generalization ability.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we construct a large-scale face anti-spoofing dataset, CelebA-
Spoof, with 625,537 images from 10,177 subjects, which includes 43 rich at-
tributes on face, illumination, environment and spoof types. We believe CelebA-
Spoof would be a significant contribution to the community of face anti-spoofing.
Based on these rich attributes, we further propose a simple yet powerful multi-task
framework, namely AENet. Through AENet, we conduct extensive experiments
to explore the roles of semantic information and geometric information in face
anti-spoofing. To support comprehensive evaluation and diagnosis, we establish
three versatile benchmarks to evaluate the performance and generalization ability
of various methods under different carefully-designed protocols. With several
valuable observations revealed, we demonstrate the effectiveness of CelebA-Spoof
and its rich attributes which can significantly facilitate future research.
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9 Appendix
9.1 Detail Information of CelebA-Spoof Dataset
Spoof Images in CelebA. As shown in Figure 9. In CelebA [25], there are
347 “spoof” images, including poster, advertisements and portrait etc. For spoof
instruments selection and live data collection on CelebA-Spoof, we manually
examine these images and remove them.
Table 8. Input sensor split in CelebA-Spoof, there are 24 different input sensors which
are split into 3 groups based on image quality
Sensor Dataset Pix. (MP) Release Sensor Dataset Pix. (MP) Release Sensor Dataset Pix. (MP) Release
Low-Quality
Sensor
Honor V8 train test val 1200 2016
Middle-Quality
Sensor
vivo X20 train test val 1200 2018
High-Quality
Sensor
HUAWEI P30 train test val 4000 2019
OPPO R9 train test val 1300 2016 Gionee S11 train test val 1300 2018
HUAWEI MediaPad M5 train test 1200 2016 vivo Y85 train val 1600 2018
Xiaomi Mi Note3 train test val 1200 2016 Hisense H11 train val 2000 2018
Gionee S9 train test val 1300 2016 iphone XR train 1200 2018
meizu 16S train test val 4800 2019Logitech C670i train 1200 2016
OPPO A5 train 1300 2018
ThinkPad T450 train 800 2016
Moto X4 train test val 1200 2017 OPPO R17 train 1600 2018
vivo NEX 3 train 6400 2019
vivo X7 train test val 1200 2017 OPPO A3 train test val 1200 2019
Dell 5289 train 800 2017 Xiaomi 8 train test val 1200 2019
OPPO A73 train 1600 2017 vivo Y93 train test val 1300 2019
Fig. 9. Representative examples of the “spoof ” images in CelebA
Input Sensor Split. As shown in Table 8, according to imaging quality, we
split 24 input sensors into 3 groups: low-quality sensor, middle-quality sensor
and high-quality sensor. In detail, an input sensor is not necessarily used in the
all training, verification and testing set, so we specify which dataset these input
sensors would cover. Specifically, for cross-domain benchmark in CelebA-Spoof,
only input sensors which are both used in training set and testing set are selected.
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9.2 Experimental Details
Formulations of Evaluation Metrics. To establish a comprehensive bench-
mark, we unify 7 commonly used metrics (i.e. APCER, BPCER, ACER, EER,
HTER, AUC and FPR@Recall). Besides AUC, EER and FPR@Recall which
are the most common metrics of classification tasks, we list definitions and
formulations of other metrics. 1) APCER, BPCER and ACER. Refer to [4,24],
Attack Presentation Classification Error Rate (APCER) is used to evaluate
the classification performance of models for spoof images. Bona Fide Presenta-
tion Classification Error Rate (BPCER) is used to evaluate the classification
performance of models for live images:
APCERSs =
1
NSs
NSs∑
i=1
(1−Resi) (3)
APCER =
1
Nspf.
Nspf.∑
i=1
(1−Resi) (4)
BPCERSf =
1
NSf
NSf∑
i=1
Resi (5)
BPCER =
1
Nliv.
Nliv.∑
i=1
Resi (6)
ACER =
(APCER+BPCER)
2
(7)
where, NSs is the number of the spoof images of the given spoof type. NSs
is the number of the live images of the given face attribute. Nliv. is the number
of all live images. Resi takes the value 1 if the ith images is classified as an
spoof image and 0 if classified as live image. APCERSs is computed separately
for each micro-defined spoof type (e.g. “photo”, “A4”, “poster”) and APCER
is the average of FAR and FRR, k is the number of micro-defined spoof type.
Specifically, in CelebA-Spoof, we define BPCERSf which is computed separately
for each face attribute. To summarize the overall performance of live images and
spoof images, the Average Classification Error Rate (ACER) is used, which is
the average of the APCER and the BPCER at the decision threshold defined by
the Equal Error Rate (EER) on the testing set. 2) HTER. The aforementioned
metrics are employed on intra-dataset (CelebA-Spoof) evaluation. For cross-
dataset evaluation, HTER [12] is used extensively:
HTER(D2) =
FAR(τ(D1), (D2)) + FRR(τ(D1), (D2))
2
(8)
where τ(Dn) is a threshold, Dn is the dataset, False Acceptance Rate (FAR) and
False Rejection Rate (FRR) is the value in D2. In cross-dataset evaluation, the
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Table 9. The mAP result of single-task and multi-task. There is huge space to improve
the learning of S i in multi-task fashion. Bolds are the best results
Attribute Model mAP (%)
Ss AENetSs 45.7
AENetC,S 46.2
Sf AENetSf 68.5
AENetC,S 70.5
S i AENetSi 57.1
AENetC,S 43.3
Depthmap of Live Images Reflectionmap of Spoof Images
Fig. 10. All live images have depth maps, but only the second and the third spoof
image has reflection artifacts. Zoom in for better visualization
value of τ(Dn) is estimated on the EER using the testing set of the dataset D1.
In this equation, when D1 6= D2, we have the cross-dataset evaluation.
The Limitations of Reflection Map. For ablation study of geometric infor-
mation, we do not use reflection maps as unique binary supervision. This is
because only parts of spoof images show reflect artifacts as shown in Figure 10.
In this figure, only the second and the third spoof image shows reflect artifacts,
the reflection map for other spoof images is zero. However, each live image has
its corresponding depth map.
Multi Task and Single Task. Besides ablation study of semantic information.
We compare AENetSf , AENetSs and AENetSi with AENetC,S to explore whether
multi-task learning can promote classification performance of these semantic
information. In detail, as mentioned in model setting of Sec. Ablation Study
on CelebA-Spoof. AENetSf , AENetSs and AENetSi are trained for classification
of each semantic information. As shown in the Table 9. It shows that the
mAP performance of S f and the Ss in AENetC,S is better than AENetSf and
AENetSs . Specifically, these two semantic information are proven crucial to
improve classification of live/spoof images in ablation study. Besides, the mAP
performance of S i of AENetC,S is worse than AENetSi . This is because we set
the λ = 0.01 of S i in the multi-task training but λ = 1 for all single task model.
This small value let S i difficult to converge in multi task learning.
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Table 10. Intro-dataset Benchmark results of CelebA-Spoof. AENetC,S,G achieved the
best result. Bolds are the best results; ↑ means bigger value is better; ↓ means smaller
value is better
Model Parm. (MB)
Recall (%)↑
AUC↑ EER (%)↓ APCER (%)↓ BPCER (%)↓ ACER (%)↓
FPR = 1% FPR = 0.5% FPR = 0.1%
AENetC,G 79.9 98.3 97.2 91.4 0.9982 1.2 4.98 1.26 3.12
AENetC,S 79.9 98.5 97.8 94.3 0.9980 1.3 4.22 1.21 2.71
AENetC,S,G 79.9 99.2 98.4 94.2 0.9981 0.9 3.72 0.82 2.27
Table 11. Cross-domain benchmark results of CelebA-Spoof. Bolds are the best results;
↑ means bigger value is better; ↓ means smaller value is better
Protocol Model
Recall (%) ↑
AUC↑ EER (%)↓ APCER (%)↓ BPCER (%)↓ ACER (%)↓
FPR = 1% FPR = 0.5% FPR = 0.1%
1
Baseline 94.6 92.3 86.4 0.985 3.8 9.19 3.84 6.515
AENetC,G 93.7 89.7 73.1 0.984 3.4 7.66 3.11 5.39
AENetC,S 96.5 93.1 83.4 0.992 2.3 3.78 1.8 2.79
AENetC,S,G 96.9 93.0 83.5 0.996 1.8 3.00 1.48 2.24
2
Baseline # # # 0.996±0.003 1.8±0.9 7.44±2.62 1.81±0.9 4.63±1.66
AENetC,G # # # 0.994±0.006 1.7±0.6 9.16±1.97 1.56±1.68 5.36±1.23
AENetC,S # # # 0.996±0.003 1.2±0.9 5.08±4.41 0.95±0.68 4.02±2.6
AENetC,S,G # # # 0.997±0.003 1.3±1.2 4.77±4.12 1.23±1.06 3.00±2.9
Table 12. Cross-dataset benchmark results of CelebA-Spoof. AENetC,S,G achieves the
best generalization performance. Bolds are the best results; ↑ means bigger value is
better; ↓ means smaller value is better
Model Training Testing HTER (%) ↓
Baseline CelebA-Spoof CASIA-MFSD 20.1
AENetC,G CelebA-Spoof CASIA-MFSD 18.2
AENetC,S CelebA-Spoof CASIA-MFSD 17.7
AENetC,S,G CelebA-Spoof CASIA-MFSD 13.1
9.3 Benchmark on Heavier Model
In order to build a comprehensive benchmark, besides ResNet-18 [13], we also
provide the corresponding results based on a heavier backbone, i.e. Xception [7].
All the results on the following 3 benchmarks are based on Xception. Detail
information about benchmark based on ResNet-18 is shown in paper. 1) Intra-
Dataset Benchmark. As shown in Table 10, AENetC,S,G based on Xception achieve
better performance comparing to AENetC,S,G based on ResNet-18, especially when
FPR is smaller (i.e. FPR=0.5% and FPR=0.1%). This is because model with
heavier parameters can achieve better robustness. 2) Cross-domain Benchmark. As
shown in Table 11, AENetC,S,G based on Xception achieve the better performance
than AENetC,S,G based on ResNet-18. And in protocol 1, comparing to baseline
based on Xception. AENetC,S,G based on Xception outperforms baseline by 67.3%
in APCER. 3) Cross-dataset Benchmark. As shown in Table 12. Performance
of models based on Xception is worse than models based on ResNet-18. This is
because models with heavier parameters tend to fit the training data.
